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Abstract: The literature reports the mean impact of trade preferences. The literature on the agoa impact is no
exception. The mean impact can be sensitive to heterogeneity in the adoption of preferences by recipients.
Nonetheless, the choice of countries included in the sample can play a role in determining the level of the
impact. A small increase at the bottom of the distribution is more likely to present a large impact (in
percentage terms) compared to the top 20% – 5%. In this paper, we investigate the gains to developing
countries focussing on where they lie on the export distribution. This way, heterogeneity can be controlled
for and the impact at various percentiles of the distribution can be estimated. We carry out a quantile
regression on a sample of countries selected by matching countries on an estimated propensity score as well
as the full sample for comparison. Secondly, we decompose the impact using methodology in the spirit of the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition found in Machado and Mata (2005) for quantile regressions. We find that
gains to agoa recipients is confined to the top 5% of the export distribution. On the contrary the gains to the
recipients from exporting to the EU is mainly at the bottom 25% and the median. There is an unambiguous
decline in their exports to the rest of the world relative to the counter-factual countries they are compared
with. The decomposition exercise supports the quantile results and shows that both coefficient and the
covariate differences between the two groups explain the difference in the total change at the various
quantiles.
Keywords: Trade preferences, African Growth and Opportunity Act, Africa, Matching
1I have benefited from discussions with senior colleagues and peers at Sussex. As usual all remaining
errors are entirely mine.
1 Introduction
Trade economists have been fascinated by non-reciprocal preferences for some decades now. This
began with the introduction of the GSP by developed economies in the 1970s and continued into
the 1980s and through till today with the introduction of newer non-reciprocal preferential schemes
for developing countries. The EU and USA have a myriad of these schemes with some countries
having membership of two or more schemes. There is large empirical literature that have devoted
much attention to the analysis of the impact of trade preferences. Majority of the empirical literature
have focussed on the EU’s trade preferences (such as general system of preferences (GSP) GSP+,
EU-African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) and Everything but Arms (EBA) preferences) with quite a
few studying the impact of agoa. These have been varied, and vary along methodological lines
(Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010b; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006); as well as the empirical implementation
of the analysis (Cipollina and Salvatici, 2010b).
Much of the literature has centred on the definition of non-reciprocal preferences, that is whether
to use dummy variables or preference margins to represent the preferences (for example, Cipollina
and Salvatici, 2010a). Agostino et al. (2007); Aiello et al. (2010); Brenton and Hoppe (2006);
Brenton and Ikezuki (2004); Collier and Venables (2007); Condon and Stern (2011); Frazer and
Van Biesebroeck (2010); Gibbon (2003); Mattoo et al. (2003) and Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) are
among the papers studying the impact of trade preferences for developing countries. Others have
focussed on the utilization of preferences (Bureau et al., 2006; Nilsson, 2005, 2011; UNCTAD,
2003), there is also a subgroup focussing on preference erosion due to the multilateral liberalization
of tariffs (Alexandraki and Lankes, 2004; Francois et al., 2006; Hoekman et al., 2006, 2009; Liapis,
2007; UNCTAD, 2007). Nonetheless, rules of origin that limit the use of preferences is also studied
in the literature (Augier et al., 2004; Brenton and Manchin, 2003; Brenton and O¨zden, 2005; Cadot
and de Melo, 2007; Carrere et al., 2011; Edwards and Lawrence, 2010). The dominant tool used
by many of the articles listed earlier in analysing the impact is the gravity model 1. In using the
gravity model Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Cipollina and Salvatici (2010b) have advocated for
the use of the poisson pseudo maximum likelihood models to account for the numerous zeros found
in trade data. These methods have been extended to firm level and tariff line data in recent papers
(for example, Aiello et al., 2010)
This paper attempts to fit within this body of literature by analysing the impact of agoa on
exports of recipient countries to the USA, EU and the rest of the world (ROW). We depart from the
standard empirical applications mentioned above, by defining a counter-factual set of countries for
the preference recipients. This is done by matching countries receiving the agoa preferences to a
set of countries having similar characteristics but are not agoa beneficiaries2. Quantile regressions
1Collier and Venables (2007) is an exception and a few others.
2These characteristics include area of country, gross domestic product, population, whether landlocked, English or
Spanish speaking, distance to the USA, religion, per capita gross domestic product, savings per gross national income,
corruption, regulatory quality, voice & accountability, agricultural land area (% of total land area) and World Bank
income classification (low/lower middle/upper middle income classification)
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are then applied to the matched sample of countries. For comparison, the analysis is also performed
using the non-matched sample. Using the quantile framework allows us to study whether the impact
of agoa has had a heterogeneous impact on the recipients. Matching the countries reduces the
heterogeneity of the sample of countries although the sample remaining does not become fully
homogeneous. Removing some of the heterogeneity and using the restricted sample thus allows a
cleaner estimate of the impact of the preference at the various quantiles. This might explain the
large variation in the impact of agoa that is reported within the literature. The large sample in
addition exaggerates the impact of agoa as would be shown in the results reported in section (5).
The paper seeks to answer the following questions, (a) has the exports of agoa recipients to
other destinations suffered as a result of the agoa preference? (b) Are there any differences in the
impact across percentiles of the export distribution? (c) what factors explain the raw difference in
agoa and non-agoa recipients? and (d) is the quantile impact affected by the choice of countries
used as the counter-factual? Our contribution is the careful construction of the counter-factual
outcomes for assessing the impact of agoa. Secondly, we not only focus on the impact on exports
to the USA but also provide evidence on the impact of the policy to exports of recipients to other
destinations (EU and rest of the world) enabling a more conclusive assessment of the agoa impact.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2, provides a brief review of the empirical
agoa literature. Section 3, provides a descriptive and graphical portrayal of the efects of agoa.
Section 4, presents the data and econometric approach. Section 5, discusses the results. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical literature
The empirical literature on agoa has mixed results. Studies such as Collier and Venables (2007);
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) and Nouve (2005) do find all their impacts to be positive. On the
contrary, studies such as Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009); Lederman and O¨zden (2007); McKay
(2012); Mueller (2008); Nouve and Staatz (2003); Seyoum (2007); Tadesse and Fayissa (2008);
Tadesse et al. (2008) and Zappile (2011) do report mixed coefficients. The direction of the impacts
and size vary with the level of disaggregation of exports, the products chosen, the period covered by
the study, the definition of the dependent variable and the estimation method used. In this section,
we review the evidence presented in a few of the papers. Table (1) below provides a summary of
existing studies on agoa.
Collier and Venables (2007) working with apparel exports for the period 1991 to 2005 for 110
countries do find a positive impact of agoa. They use the ratio of apparel exports to the US relative
to exports to the EU as the dependent variable. They estimate that, the agoa apparel provision
increased exports to the USA by 7.4 times that of the EU. In all seven regressions the estimated
impact did not increase beyond a multiple of 14.2.
Similarly, Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) using disaggregated imports find the impact to
be around 42% for apparel products. On the other hand, AGOA-GSP and AGOA-Manufactured
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products report lower impacts of 13% and 15% respectively.
Lederman and O¨zden (2007) focus on geographical and political determinants to identify the
impact of USA’s trade preferences. The estimations are based on the gravity model. Unlike the
literature focussing on the agoa impact, they reviewed additional preferences offered by the USA to
other regions of the world. They find that most preference beneficiaries increase their exports up to
three-fold relative to countries excluded from receiving the preferences.
Nouve (2005) uses various dynamic panel estimators to estimate the impact of agoa. Forty-six
African countries are selected for the study covering the period 1996 – 2004. His approach is a
departure from existing approaches—since the literature tends to avoid using lagged values of the
export variable to identify the impact of agoa. The gravity model is the main specification adopted
for the estimations. Nouve (2005) concludes that the contribution of an increase in agoa is 16 – 20
cents for every dollar increase in exports to the USA. A contrary result found by Nouve (2005) to
the earlier literature, is that, apparel and textiles did not yield significant increases in total exports3.
Nouve and Staatz (2003) using quarterly data for a sample of 46 African countries find incon-
clusive evidence on the impact of agoa4. Their analysis focusses on the agricultural sector and
there is limited evidence of a strong impact in this sector within the existing literature. One might
attribute this effect to the strong subsidies the EU and USA have on their domestic agricultural
sector.
Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) is the second paper presented that departs from the traditional
impact studies. They measure the impact of Chinese exports on agoa exporters. They analyse
whether the Chinese exports have crowded-out African exports to the American market. Based
on disaggregated data on 48 African countries for the period 1995 to 2005, they find evidence of
Chinese exports displacing African exports to the USA.
Mueller (2008); Seyoum (2007) and Zappile (2011) do not find any significantly positive impacts
of agoa5. Finally,Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) study the impact using data between 1991 and 2006.
They find some positive impacts for a number of HS2 digit products used in separate regressions.
The estimates are decomposed into impacts due to exports in new sectors and exports due to a
higher volume of exports in existing sectors. The strongest impact they find, are in the new sectors
where exports have been ’initiated’. On the contrary, not much improvement is found in existing
3Recent work by Rotunno et al. (2012) also note that that China accounted for a large majority of apparel exports of
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, and Madagascar. The apparel exports of these countries and a few others were mainly due
to Chinese ’transshipments’ to take advantage of the favourable rules of origin of agoa at the time. The ’transshipments’
have declined markedly since the removal of quotas by the USA on Chinese apparel exports. Similarly, McKay (2012)
finds that the end of the multifibre arrangement (MFA) has reduced the advantage agoa recipients had in apparel and
textiles. Moreover, he questions whether agoa played any role in the success of apparel—rather, he attributes the
success partly to the existing multifibre arrangement at the time.
4The maximum estimate of 759.5 which seems out of place in table (1) is due to having the dependent variables in
levels rather than logs. However, for the regressions based on a log definition of the dependent variable the coefficients
reported on the agoa dummy are less than 2. Again, this points to how the definition of the dependent variable can
influence the estimated impact of agoa.
5Both Mueller (2008) and Zappile (2011) use a Prais-Winsten transformed least square regression while Seyoum
(2007) adopts an ARIMA time series estimation method.
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export sectors6.
Table 1: Summary of the empirical literature
Estimated coefficients
Authors Years Countries Data Methodology Mean Min Max Number
Collier and Venables (2007) 15 World Apparel & Textiles OLS 2.086 0.900 2.650 9
Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) 9 AGOA/World All HS8 digit OLS 0.308 0.030 0.452 4
Giovannetti and Sanfilippo (2009) 11 Africa ISIC 3 - 6 digit 2SLS/GMM/OLS 0.030 -0.135 0.143 22
Lederman and O¨zden (2007) 1 World Total trade Tobit/Heckman 1.138 -0.811 2.027 5
McKay (2012) 21 AGOA & dev Apparel & Textiles OLS 0.129 -0.140 0.365 4
Mueller (2008) 11 AGOA Total non oil OLS -0.163 -0.163 -0.163 1
Nouve (2005) 9 Africa Total exports Sys./diff. GMM 0.174 0.040 0.220 16
Nouve and Staatz (2003) 4 AGOA Agricultural exports OLS 159.546 -0.145 769.500 18
Seyoum (2007) 8 AGOA Total imports ARIMA -0.929 -11.921 0.540 14
Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) 16 AGOA All HS 2 digit Tobit 1.010 -2.120 3.457 32
Tadesse et al. (2008) 16 AGOA Total imp./SITC 1 dig. Tobit 0.486 -1.224 2.912 13
Zappile (2011) 11 AGOA Non Oil OLS -0.141 -0.141 -0.141 1
Source: Author’s elaboration
3 Stylised facts about agoa exports to the USA
The first two figures in this section depict the changes in the share of preferential (agoa) imports
into the USA as a result of its introduction. They chart how the recipients have lowered their share
of no programme and GSP exports to increase their share of agoa exports in their total exports to
the USA over the period 2001 - 2008. The increase in shares varies across the recipients. There is a
clustering of countries in the top left and bottom right corners of the 2001 – 2008 sub figures in
figure (1). An indication that not all countries have shifted exporting under no programme (MFN)
to preferential exports. But the clustering of countries in the bottom right corner indicates that a
number of countries have actually seen an increase in their share of agoa exports. Nonetheless
there are some countries that have not taken advantage of the preference and still have their exports
entering the USA under no specific programme. Several countries have one time or the other had
an export share of agoa in their total exports to the USA above 30%. The second figure (2) makes
the comparison between GSP and agoa imports by the USA from each of the recipients. Here the
countries are clustered along the preferential import share axis. The figure indicates that fewer
countries have a GSP export share greater than 30%.
Much of the empirical analysis on agoa captures this increase in agoa depicted here. Thus, the
seven-fold increase reported by Collier and Venables (2007) is justified by looking at how agoa have
increased from a zero share to approximately 90% share for a couple of countries. It is however,
useful to investigate how countries are faring with respect to their exports to other destinations
and whether their exports to other destinations have suffered as a result of the agoa preference.
One of the aims of the paper is to capture what has happened to the exports of recipients to other
destinations.
6These impacts are associated with the extensive and intensive margins respectively as is popularly used in the trade
literature.
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on the USITC database.
Figure 1: agoa vs. No Programme Shares in total Imports
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on the USITC database.
Figure 2: agoa vs GSP Shares in total Imports
The final figure in this section shows the trend in export shares for the top five agoa exporters—
Nigeria, Angola, South Africa, Republic of Congo and Chad. In addition, quadratic and linear
fitted lines are included. Nigeria, Congo and Chad display non-linearities in their export shares
over time. Chad shows a marked increase in exports to the USA while there is a similar decline
in exports to the EU. From the figure it points towards a shift of exports to the EU towards the
USA to take advantage of agoa. Their share of exports to the rest of the world has stayed fairly at
the same level throughout the period. In spite of the shifting of exports there is a gradual reversal
of the increase in exports to the USA after 2006. At the same time exports to the EU has began
increasing. Nigeria shows a similar pattern, however it is not as dramatic as the shares for Chad.
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Another difference is that there is a gradual increase in Nigerian exports to the rest of the world.
This increase is probably explained by exports of crude oil to neighbouring countries and China.
Angola also shows a steep increase in exports to the rest of the world. Both exports to the USA
and EU are also declining however, the decline in exports to the USA is relatively steeper. Again,
Angola is a major oil exporter. Similarly, South Africa shows an increase in share of exports to
ROW and a declining share to the EU. Although, there is a decline in the share of exports to the
USA, this is much less pronounced relative to the EU. For Congo, Increases in the share of exports
to ROW increases until 2004 and then, starts to decline. The share of exports to the USA increases
throughout the period. The export share to the EU on the other hand turns upwards from about
2004.
Although the graphs in this section show a pattern of higher shares of agoa, accounting for other
destinations and comparing the performance to other countries non-agoa countries might provide a
different picture of the impact. Moreover, a peek into the top five agoa exporters does show that the
impact of agoa on their exports have been varied. Increases in the share of exports to the USA has
been at the cost of shares to the other destinations. The larger the gains in the exports to the USA
the larger the losses in shares to the other destinations. Nonetheless, not all countries have been
able to sustain the increases in export shares to the USA. The analysis in the results section aims to
through further light on their exports to other destinations.
4 Econometric Approach and Data
4.1 Quantile Regression Framework
In applying our regression analysis, we use the quantile regression estimator of Koenker and Bassett
(1978). The decision to incorporate the quantile framework is to capture any differences that might
occur at the various percentiles of the export distribution. Secondly, ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression is sensitive to outliers and these can influence the results. The median regression on the
other hand is less sensitive to outliers (see for instance Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge,
2002). Thus, using the quantile regression is useful in the presence of outliers. Besides, if treatment
is heterogeneous then estimating the effect for various percentiles of the distribution is helpful in
sorting out these issues. Thus, one can estimate the effects at the 25th percentile and also at the
75th percentile to show if there are any significant differences in the tails of the distribution. For the
purposes of this paper, the 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles are estimated.
We have both cross-sectional and panel data available for the quantile regression analysis. The
cross-section data poses no serious challenges for estimation and it is based on Koenker and Bassett
(1978) and Koenker and Hallock (2001). However, our panel data poses some challenges for
estimation and is discussed next. Several issues have been raised and researched into with regards
to quantile regression for panel data (Abrevaya and Dahl, 2008; Canay, 2011; Firpo et al., 2009;
Geraci and Bottai, 2007; Koenker, 2005; Powell, 2011; Rosen, 2012; Wooldridge, 2002). Given the
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(a) Nigeria (b) Angola (c) S. Africa
(d) Congo (e) Chad
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the UN Comtrade database.
Figure 3: Shares of exports in selected countries
following panel specification, there is the problem of how to treat ci which is the unobserved effects.
Qτ (yit|xit) = xitθ0 + ci + uit.
Where, Qτ (uit|xit) = 0.
The problem of incidental parameters appears if the fixed effects are estimated (Koenker, 2005;
Wooldridge, 2002). This is particularly serious when there are a large number of fixed effects
due to a large number of countries or units—leading to parameters being inconsistently estimated
(Koenker, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002). The literature suggests the following approaches around the
problem. One way, is by using the Chamberlain/Mundlak correlated random effects approach.
This helps in reducing the problem of estimating several fixed effects. The unobserved effects are
estimated in terms of the averages of the time varying explanatory variables.
ci = ψ0 + x¯iξ0 + ai; yit = ψ0 + xitθ + x¯iξ0 + υit
where υit = ai + uit, the composite error term. A variation of this is also presented by Abrevaya
and Dahl (2008) for two time periods. For the Chamberlain/Mundlak approach we need to impose
an independence assumption that is vit is independent of the x’s. This requires strong independence
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assumptions to identify the parameters of interest (Wooldridge, 2002). Which Wooldridge (2002)
notes that, it implies parallel quantile functions. Two other approaches discussed by Wooldridge
(2002) include estimations using time demeaned data y¨it = x¨itθ0 + u¨it. A pooled quantile regression
can also be estimated on differenced data, that is ∆yit = ∆xitθ0 + ∆uit. The differenced data
removes the unobserved component ci just as the the time-demeaned regression does. Doing this,
thus allows the regression to be estimated without having to worry about the fixed effects and the
problems of incidental parameters that it gives rise to (Wooldridge, 2002). A fourth approach, is the
penalized fixed effects estimator of Koenker (2004, 2005) which attempts at resolving the issue with
panel data by adding an additional parameter in the regression that serves as a penalty by reducing
the parameter estimates. In the Koenker approach the fixed effects are estimated, however, the
inconsistency they add to the parameter estimates are offset by the penalty parameter incorporated in
the regression. We however, adopt the Chamberlain/Mundlak correlated RE framework advocated
in Wooldridge (2002) for our analysis.
The following two equations are estimated for the cross-section and panel data respectively.
Qτ (yi|xi) = αcsτ + βcsτ AGOAi + xiγcsτ + ξcsτ + it (1)
Qτ (yit|xit) = αpτ + βpτAGOAit + xitγpτ + x¯itξpτ + ηt + υit (2)
Where υit = ai+εit, Qτ (i|xi) = 0, Qτ (υit|xit) = 0, τ ∈ (0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95) and is to show
that the estimated coefficients are for different quantiles. p and cs are for pooled and cross-section
respectively.
The quantile estimations are motivated by the gravity model which is one of the standard tools in
the empirical trade literature 7 Equation (1) is the first of our structural quantile estimating equations
for the cross-section. The controls include gravity type variables namely, dummies for english,
spanish and landlocked, the logs of distance, area, population and GDP. Equation (2) on the other
hand, represents our estimating equation for the panel data. The same covariates used in equation (1)
are used in the panel case. These are then augmented with the means of the time varying covariates
for each country i as well as time effects (ηt) to account for changes in preferences offered and
market demand shocks. Additionally, using the structural quantile estimation allows for a simple
test of the equality of the coefficients across the various quantiles. That is, the null hypothesis
βcs0.25 = β
cs
0.50 = β
cs
0.75 = β
cs
0.95 and β
p
0.25 = β
p
0.50 = β
p
0.75 = β
p
0.95 are tested for the cross-section and
panel respectively. A rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the effects of the preference vary
across the various quantiles estimated.
7Cipollina and Salvatici (2010a) conducts a meta-analysis of several studies that have employed gravity models on
studying reciprocal trade agreements. This is a small subset of the larger literature using gravity models. The literature
has used gravity models for several areas, such as studies on foreign direct investment, transport costs, migration, free
trade agreements, regional trade agreements and the impact of disasters on trade among several other areas in the
trade literature. Cardamone (2007) is another survey of gravity models in the area of preferential trade agreements. In
addition, Anderson (1979); Anderson and van Wincoop (2003); Anderson and Yotov (2012); Baier and Bergstrand
(2009); Baldwin and Taglioni (2006); Chaney (2008); Helpman et al. (2007); Silva and Tenreyro (2006); Westerlund
and Wilhelmsson (2009) and a few others are studies that discuss the methodological and theoretical issues involved
with gravity equations.
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4.2 Data
Data is obtained from several sources. Data for the outcomes are obtained from the UN-Comtrade
database. The World Development Indicators and IMFs International Financial Statistics databases
provide macroeconomic indicators (such as, gross domestic product, inflation, population, value-
added (in industry, manufacturing, agriculture, construction, services, etc), interest rates, exchange
rates among others) for the purposes of matching similar countries. Additionally, Kaufmann’s
Global Governance8, Database of Political Institutions9, Polity IV and Bates et al (2005)10 databases
provide political, cultural and religious data to augment the vector of control variables needed
to perform a realistic match. Finally, gravity type variables are obtained from the CEPII gravity
database 11.
A panel of 35 treated countries from SSA and some 130 control countries (developing countries
in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean as well as North Africa) for the years 1991 – 2010 is
employed in the study. After matching the number of control countries included in the estimation
drops to 40 countries—giving us a total of 75 countries for the matching estimators. Table (10) in
the appendix shows the number of treated and control countries falling within each block of the
propensity score as well as the overall number of treated and control countries matched.
5 Results and Discussion
To motivate the choice of the quantile regression we show the distribution of the three outcome
variables used in the analysis. The kernel density estimates in figure (4) shows the differences in
the distribution of exports for agoa, non-agoa and Caribbean Basin Trade Protection (cbtpa)12
exporters. The cbtpa exporters are shown seperately since they have similar tariff preferences as the
agoa recipients. Thus, in the analysis in the next sections, they are excluded from the control group
of countries to allow the impact of the agoa preference on the African countries to be identified at
the estimated quantiles of interest. Figure (5) provides the quantile plots for the outcome variables
for agoa and non-agoa countries. The diagonal solid line is a reference line indicating points of
symmetry for a distribution. Given that, in all the graphs, the points of the outcome variable lie
off the reference line, it can be concluded that the distributions are heavily skewed. The non-agoa
outcomes are skewed to the left.
8www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/
9Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. “New tools in comparative
political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World Bank Economic Review.
10Robert Bates ; Karen Feree; James Habyarimana; Macartan Humphreys ; Smita Singh, “Other Political Data
(updated 2005)”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/14977 UNF:5:XzsUmjt4AZzpm9JB3hO6pA== Murray Research Archive
[Distributor] V1 [Version]
11http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/gravity.asp
12These are mainly countries in the Caribbean Basin region. We also exclude Central American countries, Dominican
Republic and Mexico since they have a free trade agreement with the USA.
10
(a) Exports to the EU (b) Exports to the USA (c) Exports to ROW
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the UN Comtrade database.
Figure 4: Kernel Density estimates of exports, by preference
(a) Exports to EU–AGOA (b) Exports to USA–AGOA (c) Exports to ROW–AGOA
(d) Exports to EU–Non-AGOA (e) Exports to USA–Non-AGOA (f) Exports to ROW–Non-AGOA
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the UN Comtrade database.
Figure 5: Quantiles plots of exports: AGOA and Non-AGOA countries
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5.1 Cross-section results
Tables (2 & 3) report the quantile estimates for the cross-section13. The first table is based on the
common support sample obtained from our propensity score estimation in the previous section.
On the other hand, the second table is based on our full sample including the set of countries not
on common support. In both tables, we observe varying effects of the treatment across various
percentiles of the distribution of our outcomes. Incorporating a vector of control variables does not
improve upon the significance of our estimates. The first three columns of both tables are estimated
with the treatment as the only explanatory variables. The last three columns on the other hand,
have GDP, population, area, English dummy, Spanish dummy (reference category other languages),
landlocked dummy, and distance as additional control variables.
In table (2), the impact of agoa is significant and negative at the 75th percentile for all three
destinations. There is no impact at the other percentiles estimated for the first three columns. Thus
at the 75th percentile agoa countries export less to all three destinations relative to the control
countries all other things equal. Upon adding our additional covariates, the impacts at the 75th
percentile for USA and EU are no longer significant. However, the negative impact for ROW is
maintained but, the magnitude is lower (-0.926). Additionally, at the median we observe that agoa
countries export 67.4% less exports compared to the control countries and this is significant at the
5% level of significance.
Table (3), has all three columns reporting significant estimates for the 25th percentile. After
including other control countries we find a positive impact at the 25th percentile to all three
destinations for the first three columns. Again, there is a negative and significant estimate at the 75th
percentile for exports to the USA and ROW. All remaining percentiles of the first three columns
report no significant estimates. Like the previous table incorporating our additional covariates
leads to all estimates across the percentiles for exports to the USA and EU becoming insignificant.
However, the median and 75th percentile estimates of the impact on exports to ROW remain
significant and negative14.
13A propensity score is estimated based on a logit estimation of whether a country receives the agoa preference.
Tables showing the logit results, post-estimation tests and graphs of common support are included in the appendix for
those interested. The matched sample is based on the model in the first column of table (9) and includes both control
and treated countries falling within the region of common support. The full sample includes the remaining countries
that lie outside the region of common support. A list of the countries is also presented in the appendix. For the panel
data analysis the propensity score is estimated for each year separately.
14For robustness purposes, the log differences in the dependent variable for 2002, 2005 and 2010 with the base year
1997 (that is, 2002–1997; 2005–1997 and 2010–1997) were estimated but are not shown in the paper. Similar to the
results above, the log differenced results were not significant in most cases for the common support sample. On the
contrary, including the other control countries led to significantly negative estimates for the EU at the median, 75th
and 95th percentiles for the 2005 and 2010 differences. The coefficients were negative and significant for agoa at the
median and 25 percentiles for the 2002 difference. ROW surprisingly showed positive and significant coefficients at the
median and 25th percentile for the 2010 difference—indicating a higher rate of increase in exports between the two
periods in favour of the treated countries (relative to the controls). This is quite similar to the positive impact seen in
table (3) above. The coefficient in this case is 0.518 (25th) and 0.425 (50th) which as expected are smaller than the
coefficient of 2.022 (25th) reported above. The positive impact is attributed to the fact that, 2010 was the height of the
financial crisis and thus, agoa exporters had to find other markets to absorb the exports due to the reduced demand
in the US and EU markets. Nonetheless, this positive impact is at the lower end of the export distribution and is not
12
Table 2: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the EU, USA and ROW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU USA ROW EU USA ROW
q25
AGOA Treatment 0.865 1.218 -0.257 0.493 0.00349 -0.755
(0.814) (1.321) (0.838) (0.434) (0.763) (0.572)
Constant 17.72∗∗∗ 15.56∗∗∗ 19.49∗∗∗ 5.452∗ 6.354+ 9.284∗∗∗
(0.610) (1.077) (0.671) (2.575) (3.202) (1.479)
q50
AGOA Treatment -0.219 -0.315 -0.919 0.584 0.137 -0.674∗
(0.868) (0.970) (0.576) (0.398) (0.641) (0.291)
Constant 20.07∗∗∗ 18.77∗∗∗ 21.06∗∗∗ 8.355∗∗∗ 7.509∗ 10.61∗∗∗
(0.800) (0.755) (0.479) (2.145) (2.840) (1.646)
q75
AGOA Treatment -1.932∗∗ -2.325∗ -1.845∗ 0.158 -0.0630 -0.926∗
(0.629) (0.929) (0.774) (0.478) (0.932) (0.378)
Constant 22.94∗∗∗ 21.88∗∗∗ 22.73∗∗∗ 9.392∗∗∗ 9.429∗∗ 10.41∗∗∗
(0.517) (0.658) (0.681) (1.825) (3.360) (2.039)
q95
AGOA Treatment -0.782 -0.775 -1.499 -0.632 0.980 -0.412
(0.837) (0.958) (1.018) (0.497) (0.896) (0.442)
Constant 23.95∗∗∗ 23.71∗∗∗ 24.99∗∗∗ 13.45∗∗∗ 15.27∗∗∗ 10.68∗∗
(0.256) (0.427) (0.415) (2.149) (3.550) (3.122)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 75 75 75 74 74 74
Standard errors in parentheses Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports
Quantiles selected are .25, .50 & .75. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance, area, population
& gdp
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
observed at the top 25% – 5%.
13
Table 3: Quantile regression estimates for exports to the EU, USA and ROW: Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU USA ROW EU USA ROW
q25
AGOA Treatment 2.233∗ 1.952∗ 2.022∗∗ 0.570 -0.00848 -0.588
(0.866) (0.825) (0.688) (0.409) (0.621) (0.480)
Constant 16.35∗∗∗ 14.83∗∗∗ 17.21∗∗∗ 5.300∗∗ 7.982∗∗ 9.063∗∗∗
(0.647) (0.449) (0.501) (1.796) (2.401) (1.234)
q50
AGOA Treatment 0.636 0.230 -0.107 0.376 -0.131 -0.610∗
(0.476) (0.842) (0.440) (0.329) (0.533) (0.252)
Constant 19.21∗∗∗ 18.23∗∗∗ 20.25∗∗∗ 10.19∗∗∗ 9.493∗∗∗ 8.776∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.605) (0.313) (1.507) (1.856) (1.440)
q75
AGOA Treatment -0.472 -1.767∗ -1.100∗ 0.0486 -0.580 -0.670+
(0.698) (0.793) (0.492) (0.345) (0.877) (0.397)
Constant 21.48∗∗∗ 21.32∗∗∗ 21.98∗∗∗ 10.74∗∗∗ 11.09∗∗∗ 9.653∗∗∗
(0.621) (0.515) (0.336) (1.846) (1.870) (1.545)
q95
AGOA Treatment -0.522 -0.375 -1.499 -0.388 0.915 -0.321
(0.912) (0.949) (0.992) (0.345) (0.687) (0.492)
Constant 23.69∗∗∗ 23.31∗∗∗ 24.99∗∗∗ 13.84∗∗∗ 15.18∗∗∗ 13.15∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.347) (0.380) (1.982) (2.520) (2.698)
Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 157 157 157 128 128 128
Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables is exports
Quantiles selected are .25, .50 & .75. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance, area, population
& gdp
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Figures (9 & 10) summarise our quantile estimates. The formal tests of the equality of the
estimated impact across the percentiles are also reported in the appendix (see table 12). For the
case where no controls were included in the regression the three outcomes report significant F-tests
indicating that the estimated impact differs across the distribution. The same cannot be said of
the impact after including our controls, we are unable to reject the equality of the impact across
the four percentiles. In figures (9 – 11), the long-dashed line represents the quantile regression
coefficients and this is drawn within two dotted-lines that represent the 95% confidence interval.
The OLS coefficient is also plotted as the continuous horizontal line for comparative purposes. It
is also drawn between two dotted-lines representing the 95% confidence interval. In figure (9),
the sub-figures (a), (b) and (d) show the quantile estimates going beyond the OLS confidence
interval. This indicates that there are differences across the quantiles and that the impact is not the
same across all the quantiles estimated. The remaining sub-figures (c, e & f) lie within the OLS
confidence intervals—implying that, the effect is similar across the quantiles estimated. Figure (10)
shows similar results, however, sub-figure (c) now lies outside the OLS confidence interval at both
ends of the distribution.
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5.2 Decomposition of quantile impact
Figure (6) and (7) show the decompositions carried out according to Machado and Mata (2005)
and Melly (2005). Machado and Mata (2005) have extended the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to
quantile regressions 15. Machado and Mata (2005) decompose the wage density into changes due
to coefficients, covariates and the residual. These three terms explain the differences in the wage
densities of the two groups identified16. Melly’s (2006) decomposition of the difference between a
treated and untreated group at the θth quantile of the unconditional distribution is given by:
qˆ1(θ)− qˆ0 = [qˆ1(θ)− qˆc(θ)] + [qˆc(θ)− qˆ0(θ)],
where the qˆ0, qˆ1 are the quantiles estimated for the control and treated groups respectively and
qˆc is the counter-factual quantile distribution. The initial term in brackets provide the effect of
coefficients on the gap between the treated and counter-factual controls. The second term is due to
the effect of differences in their covariates17,18
In figure (6) the effect of the covariates and coefficients exert similar impacts on the export
gap between the agoa and non-agoa countries. The contribution of the effects of the covariates
and coefficients are larger at the tails of the distribution. The total change is mostly positive for
exports to the USA and EU. On the contrary, the export gap for exports to ROW is negative at all
quantiles. Figure (7) shows only the effect of the coefficients together with the 95% confidence
interval. The difference in the impact of the coefficients in the matched sample and full sample is
now more evident. For the USA, there is an increasing trend observed in the coefficients at the top
20% of the distribution. In the bottom 5%, although there is a sharp increase in the effect—this,
stabilises in the mid-region of the distribution. The EU on the other hand, shows a declining effect
of the coefficients at the top 30% with a steep increase at the tail of the distribution. A fairly flat
effect of the coefficients is shown for the exports to ROW. Based on the graphs above, the observed
impacts at the various quantiles are driven by a differing combination of coefficient and covariate
effects. The effects are generally not homogeneous and differ depending on which part of the
export distribution is analysed. In the decomposition literature cited above, the coefficient effect
is normally interpreted as a price effect. However, in our case, we do need to control for quota
restrictions, rules of origin, transport costs and other unobserved factors that influence the amount
of exports by these groups. Clearly, delineating these would help in identifying the price effect
more clearly and to attribute the coefficient gap to the price differential resulting from clearly higher
prices received by agoa exporters due to the lower tariffs relative to the control countries.
15A variant of this decomposition is described in Melly (2005) and Melly (2006). Melly provides the rqdeco stata
command to implement the decomposition. For more technical details and a complete description of the decomposition,
see Machado and Mata (2005); Melly (2005, 2006).
16In this case, the decomposition was for the raw wage gap between men and women.
17Melly (2006) shows that the first term gives the quantile treatment effect on the treated. Fortin et al. (2010) is
another paper showing the similarity of the decomposition to the effects in the treatment literature.
18The decomposition by Melly (2006) and Melly (2005) is numerically identical to Machado and Mata’s (2005)
estimator. As Machado and Mata’s (2005) simulations approach infinity identical results are obtained (Melly, 2006).
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(a) USA (Matched sample) (b) USA (full) (c) EU (Matched Sample)
(d) EU (full) (e) ROW (Matched sample) (f) ROW (full)
Decomposition based on the estimation of 99 quantiles with a 100 bootstrapped replications for the standard error. Covariates used in the decomposition
include area, gross domestic product, population, landlocked, and distance. Total change refers to the raw export gap between agoa and non-agoa
countries. Covariates is the difference due to the covariates and coefficients is the difference due to the coefficients estimated. The matched sample
refers to the sample of countries that were matched and fall within the area of common support. The full sample refers to all the countries included in
the dataset. A horizontal line at zero is added to show the positive and negative changes more clearly.
Figure 6: Decomposition of differences in the distribution of exports
(a) USA (Matched sample) (b) USA (full) (c) EU (Matched sample)
(d) EU (full) (e) ROW (Matched sample) (f) ROW (full)
The graphs shown are based on the estimation of 99 quantiles with a 100 bootstrapped replications for standard errors. The matched sample refers to
the sample of countries that were matched and fall within the area of common support. The full sample refers to all the countries included in the dataset.
The continuous dark line is the effect of the coefficient and the grey line enclosing the effect is the 95% confidence interval. A horizontal line at zero is
added to show the positive and negative changes more clearly.
Figure 7: Effect of estimated coefficients on export difference
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5.2.1 Panel data
The estimates reported in this section are for our panel regressions. The panel version reports
more significant estimates. The incorporation of more variation by having a time dimension has
significantly improved our results. In addition, we include dummies for each year to capture changes
in demand and also changes in the agoa preferences over time in all columns. Additionally, we add
the time averages of the time varying variables to capture elements of the fixed effects regression in
all columns. In tables (4 & 5) the first three columns include the full set of controls, year effects,
and the averages of the time varying variables. The final three columns on the other hand, excludes
the set of controls but includes the year effects and the averages of the time varying variables. In
table (4), exports to the EU are positive and significant at the 25th percentile and the median in both
columns (1) and (4). The 75th percentile is also positive and significant in column (4) while the
95th percentile is negative and significant in column (1).
In terms of exports to the USA there is a positive and significant impact of agoa at the 95th
percentile in both columns (1 & 2). At the median a positive impact is also observed in column
(5) which is significant at 10%. Exports to ROW also shows significant and negative coefficients
for the treatment for all percentiles estimated in both columns (3) and (6). The decline varies from
31.9% to 70.1%, indicating that agoa recipients exported 31.9% – 70.1% less exports to ROW than
the control countries. A casual observation of the coefficients shows that in column (3), the largest
decline is at the median while in column (6) the largest decline is at the 75th percentile. In both
columns we observe that the impact is different across the various percentiles. Formal tests of this
hypothesis (in the appendix, see table 13) indicates that the coefficients are statistically different
in column (3) but we cannot reject any difference between the coefficients in column (6) given
our F-tests of 2.584 and 1.346 respectively. We also find the impact to be statistically different for
exports to the EU at 5% (15.814 and 9.936 for columns 1 and 4 respectively). An implication of
the result is that much of the increase in exports to the EU relative to the control countries occurs
at the bottom 25% and the median of the distribution of the dependent variable. Adding the set
of controls yields marginally smaller impacts. Thus for exports to the EU, agoa countries export
29.1% – 79.1% more exports than the control.
On the contrary, exports to the USA are positive and significant at the 95th percentile. this is
quite opposite to the impact of exports to the EU. At the 95th percentile agoa countries export
57.4% – 65.8% more to the USA relative to the control countries. We find no significant estimates
at the other percentiles estimated (except at the median in column 5 which reports a 33.4% increase
relative to the control countries at the 10% level of significance).
Finally, table (5) shows the results for all countries including those not on common support. The
results are similar to the previous table. The notable differences are the negative and significant
decline in column (5) for exports to the USA at the 50th and 75th percentiles. Also, in column (4) the
impact at the 95th percentile is now significant. A third observation is that, the positive coefficients
are now larger in the second table (with the exception of column (5) where the coefficient falls from
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0.658 to 0.453 in the second table at the 95th percentile). Additionally, all the negative impacts
are also smaller in magnitude and include a few cases where significant estimates are no longer
significant. These results imply that having a larger number of countries that are dissimilar from the
preference recipients tends to exaggerate both the positive and negative impacts—positive impacts
become larger while the negative impacts become smaller in magnitude.
Figures (12 & 11)) provide a graphical summary of our coefficients. The figure provides
evidence that the quantile estimates are similar for exports to ROW in the case where there are no
control variables. On the other hand, the exports to the EU and USA are different as depicted in the
graph in both figures. Moreover, the inclusion of control variables pushes the impact at the top 25%
further away from the OLS coefficient. Again, an indicator that, the impact at the top 25% is large
and different from the other quantiles of interest.
Table 4: Structural quantile estimates of exports
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU USA ROW EU USA ROW
q25
AGOA Treatment 0.599∗∗∗ -0.132 -0.552∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.158 -0.319∗
(0.175) (0.194) (0.215) (0.123) (0.197) (0.151)
Constant -4.575 -16.44∗∗ 1.927 7.982∗∗∗ 2.930∗∗∗ 9.519∗∗∗
(3.541) (5.355) (2.646) (0.503) (0.690) (0.626)
q50
AGOA Treatment 0.453∗∗ 0.243 -0.701∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.334+ -0.349∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.222) (0.089) (0.110) (0.190) (0.100)
Constant -0.979 -18.54∗∗∗ 3.185 8.829∗∗∗ 4.745∗∗∗ 11.89∗∗∗
(2.908) (5.086) (2.715) (0.558) (0.762) (0.456)
q75
AGOA Treatment 0.0459 0.0317 -0.514∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.135 -0.554∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.271) (0.111) (0.099) (0.261) (0.097)
Constant 4.473 -30.69∗∗∗ -8.525∗ 10.34∗∗∗ 8.181∗∗∗ 12.36∗∗∗
(2.896) (8.013) (3.314) (0.507) (1.051) (0.364)
q95
AGOA Treatment -0.692∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗ -0.359∗∗ -0.345 0.658∗∗∗ -0.528∗
(0.146) (0.198) (0.117) (0.210) (0.176) (0.218)
Constant 6.510∗ -11.43 -19.24∗∗∗ 14.64∗∗∗ 13.04∗∗∗ 13.38∗∗∗
(3.154) (9.152) (3.856) (1.187) (0.538) (0.731)
Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 721 718 718 740 737 737
Countries 72 72 72 74 74 74
Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables
is exports. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance, area, population & gdp
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Structural quantile estimates of exports: All countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EU USA ROW EU USA ROW
q25
AGOA Treatment 0.419∗∗ -0.228 -0.933∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ -0.212 -0.346∗∗
(0.128) (0.199) (0.178) (0.113) (0.190) (0.125)
Constant 7.615∗∗∗ 12.21∗∗∗ 2.807∗ 7.772∗∗∗ 3.090∗∗∗ 9.705∗∗∗
(1.909) (1.844) (1.376) (0.484) (0.645) (0.554)
q50
AGOA Treatment 0.362∗ -0.295 -0.684∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ -0.379∗ -0.353∗∗∗
(0.147) (0.184) (0.077) (0.109) (0.187) (0.094)
Constant 9.026∗∗∗ 16.25∗∗∗ 3.965∗∗∗ 9.188∗∗∗ 5.412∗∗∗ 12.19∗∗∗
(1.544) (1.711) (0.915) (0.566) (0.912) (0.401)
q75
AGOA Treatment -0.0713 0.0377 -0.663∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ -0.696∗∗ -0.420∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.290) (0.105) (0.103) (0.258) (0.096)
Constant 5.270∗∗∗ 14.07∗∗∗ 4.284∗∗∗ 10.76∗∗∗ 9.167∗∗∗ 12.65∗∗∗
(1.572) (1.492) (0.966) (0.512) (1.056) (0.372)
q95
AGOA Treatment -0.603∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ -0.483∗∗∗ -0.314∗ 0.453∗∗∗ -0.388+
(0.124) (0.135) (0.113) (0.125) (0.105) (0.207)
Constant 3.780 17.80∗∗∗ 0.772 15.49∗∗∗ 13.48∗∗∗ 14.92∗∗∗
(2.410) (2.583) (2.053) (0.824) (0.280) (0.856)
Controls Yes Yes Yes No No No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1050 1047 1047 1080 1076 1076
Countries 105 105 105 108 108 108
Standard errors in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors with 500 replications in parenthesis. Dependent variables
is exports. Controls include: English, Spanish & landlocked dummies, logs of distance, area, population & gdp
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5.3 General discussion
The evidence presented above for exports to the EU and USA indicate that the impact of agoa
has been heterogeneous. This is supported by the graphs provided in section (5.2) which show
remarkably different impacts at the tails of the distribution. The increase in the absolute value of
the impact as one moves for the bottom 10% to the top 10% supports this notion of heterogeneity.
This might explain why the literature presents mixed results on the impact of agoa on exports to the
USA. The impact on exports to the USA is mainly at the top 5% and therefore is more likely to lead
to impacts larger than 2. Nonetheless, the choice of countries used in the analysis plays a key role
in determining the direction and size of the impact. This is supported by the decomposition of the
impact carried out in section (5.2). The graphs show the differential impact of both the coefficients
of agoa and non-agoa countries as well as the covariates in explaining the total impact19 of the
preference.
The role of economic growth, closeness to the export markets, land area, landlocked, and
19As the reader might have observed the words impact and gap have been used interchangeably throughout the text.
In the analysis our use of the word export gap also refers to the impact of agoa although technically speaking they
differ.
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population in determining the total impact cannot be overemphasised. These variables are however,
more prominent in explaining the export gap for the EU and USA markets. This was observed
earlier as the sharp increase in the effects at the higher quantiles as well as the positive difference
but declining trend at the lower quantiles. These two parts of the covariate and coefficient effects
tend to make the total change for the two destinations positive over a wide range of quantiles. On
the contrary, although the impacts of the coefficients and covariates look similar they start from a
lower difference compared to the EU and USA cases. Besides the rapid turnaround in the declining
differences at the higher quantiles is not as steep or rapid as is the case for the EU and USA markets.
We therefore fail to observe the total change being pushed to a positive gap in the case of exports to
ROW.
All the foregoing supports the notion that the gains in the EU and USA markets have been
counteracted by reductions in exports at other destinations. Exports to ROW has suffered more as a
result of the competing preferences of the EU and USA. Although, not obvious from the quantile
analysis there have been such effects between the EU and USA markets in relative terms. Thus,
we observe agoa recipients having relatively higher exports to the EU and USA markets compared
to non-agoa recipients. The differences are also observed at specific parts of the distribution of
exports. Moreover, for both markets the positive impact of the preference is observed at the tails of
the distribution. The bottom 25% and median are mainly where we find a positive impact on exports
to the EU. The positive impact on exports to the USA is at the top 5% of exports. Our interpretation
of this, is that, for countries finding themselves at bottom of the distribution, agoa has not reduced
their exports to the EU. On the other hand, countries at the top of the distribution have successfully
increased their exports to the USA but have been unable to sustain any increases in their exports to
the EU Exports to the EU have rather decreased for the agoa relative to the non-agoa countries,
as can be gleaned from tables (4 & 5). Now, this effect observed at these quantiles are relative to
the control group of countries and inform us about the nature of competition among the countries
falling within the tails of the distribution20.
In spite of the relatively higher exports to the EU and USA markets, the evidence points
overwhelmingly to a poor export performance relative to non-agoa countries in exports to ROW.
The result supports the emphasis African countries place on finding European and American markets
for their exports to the detriment of their neighbouring countries and other destinations outside the
EU and USA. One might be tempted to associate the inflexible rules of origin21 which makes it less
favourable for African countries to source inputs from certain regions and countries. Nonetheless,
the similarity in resources and hence exports might also be a contributing factor that explains the
poor export performance in the ROW market.
The short-run switching of markets is more evident in the trends in shares of the top 5 agoa
20A more detailed exercise of the nature and composition of agoa and non-agoa countries in the tails is not carried
out here, it is left out to be presented in a yet to be completed paper.
21On this a number of studies have examined rules of origin pertaining to various preferences. Examples include,
Brenton and Manchin (2003); Bureau et al. (2007); Carrere et al. (2011); Mattoo et al. (2003). Mattoo et al. (2003) in
particular focusses mainly on agoa rules of origin.
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exporters to the USA presented in section (3). These show for the individual countries that in some
cases there have been non-linear effects on the shares. In addition, the evidence that, increasing
exports to one destination has decreasing effects on exports to other destinations is supported by
the five sub-figures. In concluding it must be noted that the usual ceteris paribus caveats apply
and the impacts discussed are relative to the control group of countries (non-agoa). However, the
control group of countries are supposed to serve as a counter-factual to our agoa countries in terms
of how their exports would have fared in the absence of the preference. Hence, our conclusions
about the impact for agoa countries can be discussed in terms of what is happening to exports of
the recipients of the preferences.
6 Conclusion
Quantile regressions are estimated in this paper to show the heterogeneous impact of the agoa
preference on exports of recipients to the EU, ROW and USA. The results do indicate that much
of the impact on exports to the EU and USA has occurred at the tails of the export distribution.
The coefficients estimated at the quantiles of interest are found to be different across the estimated
quantiles. Thereby indicating the presence of heterogeneity of the impact of the preferences on the
outcomes to the EU and USA. There is less heterogeneity in exports to ROW. This is corroborated
by our graphical analysis that finds our estimated coefficients to be within the confidence bounds of
the mean estimated coefficient.
Exports to the EU have a positive impact at the median and bottom 25% while for the USA
the positive impact is observed at the top 5%. Nevertheless, using a larger set of countries tends
to exaggerate the impact of agoa on their exports. Positive impacts are made larger while the
magnitude of the negative impacts become lower with the additional set of countries. The lessons
from this study is that, in studying the impact of trade preferences (also other preferential trading
arrangements) it is important to bear in mind the similarity of the countries being compared in the
analysis. Bundling all countries in a regression to study the impact might yield estimates that have
been amplified.
Despite the performance in the EU and USA markets the evidence points overwhelmingly to
a poor export performance relative to non-agoa countries in exports to ROW. The result supports
the emphasis African countries place on finding European and American markets for their exports
to the detriment of their neighbouring countries and other destinations outside the EU and USA.
One might be tempted to associate the inflexible rules of origin which makes it less favourable for
African countries to source inputs from certain regions and countries. Nonetheless, the similarity
in resources and hence exports might also be a contributing factor explaining the poor export
performance in the ROW market.
The current paper extends the agoa impact literature by carrying out a decomposition of the
export gap between agoa and non-agoa recipients. Nonetheless, a second contribution is the use
of the quantile regression framework to show the heterogeneous impact of agoa on recipients.
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Decomposition methods although widely used in wage gap studies have not been as popular in the
agoa preference literature22. The decomposition indicates that, much of the differences between
agoa and non-agoa recipients are mainly due to coefficient and covariate differences that reinforce
the export gap between the two groups.
To conclude, we note that, there are a few caveats to this paper. First, the increase/decrease in
impact shown in the estimations are in comparison to the control countries and do not imply an
increase/decrease in absolute exports by each agoa country. Rather, they imply that in comparison
to a set of countries similar to them they exported more/less comparatively. Secondly, this is
arguably an initial attempt to explore what is happening to exports of agoa recipients to other export
destinations. And thus, our framework requires more work to strengthen our conclusions as well as
improve our causal framework. Particularly, we do need to explore other ways of obtaining robust
estimates for our quantile estimates based on the panel of countries. Last but not the least, it would
be useful to revisit the decomposition exercise to control for more covariates as well as identify
whether the decomposition has been influenced by unobserved factors. In this regard, researchers
can again draw upon existing studies in the labour field employing selection methods to control for
unobserved factors and endogeniety. These are areas of interest that can be explored in future work.
22A notable exception is Tadesse and Fayissa (2008) who does a different decomposition which is more in line with
the intensive margin and extensive margin literature. Fortin et al. (2010) argues that decomposition methods are relevant
for policy analysis and can be applied in a variety of settings, hence our motivation in adopting it for this paper.
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A Appendix
Table 6: Summary Statistics - panel data
count p25 p50 p75 p95 mean max
Treated Countries under common support
Exports to EU 350 122172624 436325755 1.18e+09 6.73e+09 1.64e+09 3.24e+10
Exports to USA 350 8564796 84170659 321903577 8.26e+09 1.35e+09 3.92e+10
Exports to ROW 350 133568848 417463168 1.22e+09 1.92e+10 2.56e+09 5.92e+10
Control Countries under common support
Exports to EU 400 43540262 487069826 7.81e+09 2.67e+10 5.43e+09 5.28e+10
Exports to USA 397 4044833 143788228 2.73e+09 2.21e+10 3.28e+09 3.69e+10
Exports to ROW 397 197571792 1.40e+09 7.75e+09 6.90e+10 1.25e+10 1.92e+11
All Countries including countries not under common support
Exports to EU 1100 57999974 359575132 2.05e+09 1.65e+10 3.00e+09 5.28e+10
Exports to USA 1096 6247868 131920578 1.94e+09 1.47e+10 2.46e+09 5.25e+10
Exports to ROW 1096 115290684 636021792 2.83e+09 3.95e+10 6.78e+09 1.92e+11
Table 7: Summary Statistics - Other variables
count mean min max
Mirror Exports Share-ROW 1536 0.529 0.000725 0.998
Mirror Exports Share-EU 1572 0.303 0.000131 0.999
Mirror Exports Share-USA 1539 0.169 0.000000809 0.959
No program claimed 1650 1.95e+09 0 5.48e+10
GSP Imports 1280 1.56e+08 0 6.26e+09
Non GSP Imports 1650 2.55e+08 0 1.76e+10
Non-GSP/TT Imports 1606 0.115 0 0.988
GSP/TT Imports 1278 0.074 0 1.000
No prog/TT Imports 1606 0.826 0 1.000
Area 1570 4.08e+05 10 8.51e+06
Real GDP 1278 5757.740 145.0 42188.809
Weighted distance 1570 9845.144 2387.8 16764.666
Landlocked 1580 0.139 0 1.000
Voice & Accountability 1370 42.241 0 97.000
Political Stability 1290 41.012 1.500 96.000
Government Effectiveness 1330 42.466 1.500 98.000
Regulatory Quality 1340 42.306 0 100.000
Rule of Law 1340 40.646 0 92.000
Corruption 1330 43.342 0 96.500
Adj. Saving per GNI 975 8.765 -167.5 89.299
GDP per capita 1256 3026.931 62.95 27169.707
AGOA Treatment 1650 0.212 0 1.000
Preference Type 490 1.286 1 2.000
Regions (acc. to World Bank) 1400 3.064 1 5.000
High Income (NonOECD) (HI) 1400 0.157 0 1.000
Low Income (LI) 1400 0.236 0 1.000
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 1400 0.343 0 1.000
Upper Middle Income (UMI) 1400 0.264 0 1.000
Majority Christian 1282 0.495 0 1.000
Majority Muslim 1282 0.303 0 1.000
Other Religion 1282 0.203 0 1.000
Observations 1650
Export share and preferential import data is for 2001-2010 Data for controls based on data from
1985-1999 in most cases Data from WGI are based on averages for 1996 & 1998
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Table 9: Logit estimates for propensity score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Landlocked 0.359 0.521 0.479 1.168
(0.638) (0.729) (0.735) (0.935)
Low Income (LI) 97.90 179.4+ 178.1+ 213.8+
(60.352) (94.268) (95.470) (119.411)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) 79.85∗ 110.4+ 109.8+ 133.8+
(37.811) (56.525) (57.244) (69.293)
Majority Christian 0.786 -17.82∗ -17.79∗ -29.62∗
(0.754) (8.875) (8.867) (11.851)
Majority Muslim 0.403
(0.744)
Weighted distance (log) 37.66 55.13 45.07 32.22
(42.504) (57.855) (59.116) (70.694)
Distance Squared (log) -1.973 -2.892 -2.337 -1.543
(2.329) (3.153) (3.225) (3.861)
LI× Real GDP 37.82+ 72.04∗ 72.56∗ 89.78∗
(20.905) (35.524) (36.084) (45.638)
LMI× Real GDP 40.56+ 82.39∗ 82.80∗ 101.8+
(24.418) (41.427) (42.048) (53.338)
UMI× Real GDP 50.69+ 96.37∗ 96.70∗ 119.1+
(28.703) (47.885) (48.594) (61.404)
Real GDP Squared -2.949+ -5.838∗ -5.872∗ -7.186∗
(1.650) (2.835) (2.878) (3.656)
Agric land % of land area 2.247 2.433 2.206
(1.543) (1.571) (2.025)
Other Religion -17.19∗ -17.23∗ -28.63∗
(8.679) (8.667) (11.533)
Corruption -1.500 -5.203 -7.301
(2.740) (4.774) (5.799)
Voice & Accountability -2.520 -2.779 -4.786+
(2.162) (2.223) (2.854)
Regulatory Quality 1.113 1.075 0.742
(2.312) (2.349) (2.815)
LMI× Corruption -3.962 -0.295 3.770
(3.859) (4.856) (6.262)
UMI× Corruption -3.599
(4.580)
Political Stability 1.285 1.899 2.802
(1.805) (2.093) (2.302)
Muslim× Real GDP -2.473∗ -2.468∗ -4.022∗
(1.229) (1.227) (1.626)
GDP per capita (log) 2.916∗ 3.043∗ 2.896+
(1.317) (1.357) (1.677)
Area (log) 0.113 0.0521
(0.186) (0.225)
LI× Corruption 3.478 5.872
(4.636) (5.748)
Adj. Saving per GNI -5.849
(4.915)
Constant -398.6+ -662.0+ -619.5+ -647.5
(230.638) (347.487) (352.896) (423.772)
Observations 110 103 103 90
Chi-square 40.41 53.64 54.02 55.94
Log likelihood -48.60 -39.19 -39.00 -31.17
Pseudo-R square 0.294 0.406 0.409 0.473
Standard errors in parentheses
Estimation results for the propensity score regressions. Dependent variable is the AGOA treatment.
Results in the text are based on Models 1 and 2; results in the appendix are based on model 3
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 10: Number of Controls and Treated under common support, Model 1
Non-agoa agoa Total
1 2 1 3
2 14 3 17
3 9 5 14
4 5 11 16
5 7 8 15
6 3 7 10
Total 40 35 75
30
Table 11: Covariate Balancing Tests (All Models)
Variable Sample Control (Mean) Treated (Mean) % bias % bias reduction T-test (P-Value)
landlocked Matched .371 .343 -6.839 86.364 -.219 (.586 )
landlocked UnMatched .133 .343 50.154 -2.614 (.01)
Lower Middle Income (LMI) Matched .514 .486 -6.303 90.446 -.21 (.583 )
Lower Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .187 .486 65.967 -3.384 (.001)
Upper Middle Income (LMI) Matched .343 .371 5.783 48.276 .219 (.414 )
Upper Middle Income (LMI) UnMatched .427 .371 -11.18 .545 (.587)
High Income (HI) Matched .143 .143 0 100 0 (.5 )
High Income (HI) UnMatched .387 .143 -56.962 2.635 (.01)
Majority Christian Matched .314 .4 17.198 46.429 .66 (.256 )
Majority Christian UnMatched .56 .4 -32.103 1.567 (.12)
Majority Muslim Matched .371 .371 0 100 0 (.5 )
Majority Muslim UnMatched .267 .371 22.373 -1.113 (.268)
Other Religion Matched .314 .229 -21.206 -55.172 -.712 (.76 )
Other Religion UnMatched .173 .229 13.666 -.682 (.497)
Weighted Distance (logs) Matched 9.373 9.334 -9.307 88.132 -.672 (.748 )
Weighted Distance (logs) UnMatched 9.008 9.334 78.416 -3.424 (.001)
Real GDP (logs) Matched 7.115 7.083 -3.604 96.513 -.149 (.559 )
Real GDP (logs) UnMatched 8.003 7.083 -103.35 4.933 (0)
Distance Squared (logs) Matched 87.892 87.186 -9.548 87.727 -.662 (.745 )
Distance Squared (logs) UnMatched 81.436 87.186 77.796 -3.413 (.001)
LI × Real GDP Matched 3.367 3.142 -7.614 88.32 -.253 (.6 )
LI × Real GDP UnMatched 1.218 3.142 65.191 -3.337 (.001)
LMI × Real GDP Matched 2.522 2.7 4.707 73.958 .186 (.427 )
LMI × Real GDP UnMatched 3.381 2.7 -18.075 .867 (.388)
UMI × Real GDP Matched 1.226 1.241 .401 99.303 .018 (.493 )
UMI × Real GDP UnMatched 3.404 1.241 -57.577 2.657 (.009)
Real GDP Squared Matched 51.2 50.835 -2.681 97.417 -.114 (.545 )
Real GDP Squared UnMatched 64.936 50.835 -103.789 4.926 (0)
Table 12: Tests of coefficient equality across four quantiles
Cross-section
Variable F-test (P-value) F-test (P-value) F-test (P-value) F-test (P-value)
Mirror exports to EU 3.123 (.028) 3.692 (.016) 1.378 (.253) 1.646 (.187)
Mirror exports to USA 5.258 (.002) 2.724 (.05) .961 (.413) .428 (.734)
Mirror exports to ROW 6.621 (0.000) .969 (.412) .158 (.924) .412 (.745)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Common Support No Yes No Yes
Table 13: Tests of coefficient equality across four quantiles
Panel data
On common support Not on common support
Variable F-test (P-value) F-test (P-value) F-test (P-value) F-test (P-value)
Mirror Exports to EU 9.936 (0.000) 15.814 (0.000) 20.436 (0.000) 14.371 (0.000)
Mirror Exports to USA 2.054 (.105) 3.248 (.021) 8.809 (0.000) 8.519 (0.000)
Mirror Exports to ROW 1.346 (.258) 2.584 (.052) .183 (.908) 1.762 (.153)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
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(a) Model 1 (b) Model 2
(c) Model 3 (d) Model 4
Graphs of the region of common support for all four models shown in table (9). The set of
countries used in the matched sample for the analysis in the text is based on model 1.
Figure 8: Propensity score and region of common support
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